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Abstract:This research investigates the analyzing  the barriers of Pak-india trade on 
textile exports by using CGE model.  Data were collected from 50 exporters by using simple 
random technique.  Data were analyzed by using SPSS-21version, A structural 
questionnaire was developed for the reliability and validity of the data. It was revealed that 
Exporters’opiniononexportafterdecreasingthestrengthofbarriersExporters have been 
askedif they are ready toexport moretothe INDIAafter these barrierswillbeless,and70% of 
theexporterssaidyes, 22% saidmaybe, and8% said 
no.Thus,exportersarepositiveregardingexporttotheINDIA.India’sexporttotheINDIAcan be 
increased if these barriers get less or are removed.   It was further revealed that 
Accordingly,theresultssuggestthatareductionofimporttariffsto10percentwillincreasePakistan’s 
welfareandterms-of-
tradeaswell.Althoughonemightexpectthatthereductionofimporttariffswouldincreasethedomesti
coutputandthereforeincreaseexportsales,thispolicy reformwouldadverselyaffectPakistan’s 
domesticoutputinmostofthesectorsbecauseofforeign competition.Asimilar 
impactcanbeseeninexportsalestoo 
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Introduction 
Textile industry of Pakistan is broadly divided into many sectors that are Ginning, Spinning, 
Weaving, Knitting, Towel, Dying, Printing, Processing, Hosiery, Made-ups and Garments. As 
the first objective is concerned with understanding the current status of textile industry; in 
this connection a survey of the entire textile industry will be conducted. A total of 48 
companies were be selected for conducting the research in Hyderabad, Kotri, Karachi, 
Faisalabad and Lahore region including the key integrated textile units to ensure full 
representation of all sectors. Further the above sectors of textile industry were lumped 
together into four major sectors as Spinning, Weaving (including Knitting, Dying & Printing 
(including Processing and Bleaching), and Garments (including Made-ups, towel, Hosiery 
and other manufactured items) for compiling the qualitative information. The survey 
methodology included a combination of primary data that was generated through a 
questionnaire and intensive interviews with individuals connected to the industry to identify 
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their internal issues, national issues, global issues and required remedial actions and the 
secondary data included journal articles, trade policies of Pakistan, news, and internet which 
were helpful for the second and the third objectives. In the second objective the graphs are 
used to explain the growth pattern of textile exports from the year 1980 to 2009 as the 
implementation of WTO on textile industry of Pakistan started from 1995 that was 100% 
complete in 2005. Therefore the starting 14 years from 1980 to 1994 are considered as the 
time period with quotas, whereas the last 14 years from 1995 to 2009 are considered as the 
quota free era. In the third objective developing countries like China, India, Srilanka and 
Bangladesh are taken into account to analyze the effects of WTO on them. Here the 
information collected through the above mentioned secondary sources regarding the 
benefits of becoming the member of WTO and the problems associated with its 
implementation are highlighted. 
The Textile Industry of Pakistan 
One of the major economic indicators for the development of Pakistan economy is textile 
Industry. Textile Industry is an important source of the overall and major export of the 
country. In fact, Pakistan is ranked in top most leading cotton producing countries of the 
world. Statistically, till 1997 Pakistan was named as world’s largest exporter of yarn. In 1999, 
it was ranked on the second position in the largest exporter of textile made-ups list. In textile 
made-ups sources, the second largest sources were the bed wear and linens sub sectors. 
These both shared about 28 per cent share of total textile made-ups in 1999 (SMEDA, 
2002). In addition, Pakistan became second largest exporter of bed wear and linen globally 
during that period.  
i 
DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
Data were collected from 50 exporters by using simple random technique.  Data were 
analyzed by using SPSS-21version, A structural questionnaire was developed for the 
reliability and validity of the data. 
Table6.1:Experiment-1-15PercentUniformImportTariffsEstimated Welfare and Trade 
Effects (Percentage changes in millions) 
 
 
 
Countries EV US$ 
 
% of GDP TOT V-Export V-Import Exp-Price 
 
Import-Price DTBAL-
Price 
Price 
IND 3213.97 3.40 0.41 0.4 1.23 2.1 3.68  109.74 m 
PAK 4442.63 4.35 5.98 2.19 0.61 -8.97 5.44 285.66m 
XSA -1592.56 -1.74 -0.57 -3.92 31.54 24.83 -2.12 -1322.73m 
XWA -375.79 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 149.69m 
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Description 
 
IND=INDIA 
PAK=PAKISTAN 
XSA = REST OF SOUTH ASIA 
XWA= REST OF WORLS 
All experiments were conducted with the standard general equilibrium closure of the GTAP model. 
According to the results Base line tariff for India is 18% SAFTA tariff is 5% and given MFN Tariff is 
15% and rest of world is 15%..The first experiment considered the Pakistan’s reduction of import 
tariffs to 15 percent under the unilateral trade liberalization. The impact of this scenario on regional 
welfare and the resulting percentage  changes  in  sectoral  output  and  trade  are  reported  in  
Table 6.1  Accordingly, if Pakistan (PAK) reduces its import tariffs to 15 percent unilaterally on a 
global basis to maintain a uniform external tariff rate, Pakistan’s EV US& 4442.63 and GDP 4.35, 
and India’s EV US$ 321 million (3.40 percent of the GDP). Under this scenario, Pakistan’s volume 
of imports rises by 1.23 percent while its volume of exports falls slightly by 0.4 percent reflecting the 
fact that the pressure to increase imports is stronger than the increase in demand for Pakistan’s 
exports by unilateral liberalization. However, as a result of the composite export price increase by 
2.1 percent, Pakistan’s experiences a small improvement in the terms-of-trade of 1.5 percent and 
the real GDP by 0.9 percent. The welfare gains or losses for other regions are quite varied under 
this simulation. However, since Pakistanis impact on unilateral reduction of import tariffs to 15 
percent will not affect other region’s real GDP or terms-of-trade significantly.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
DTBAL-Price
XWA -375.79 -0.02 0 -0.04 0 -0.06 
-0.05
XWA -375.79 -0.02 0 -
0.04 0 -0.06 -0.05
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Table6.2:Experiment-
115PercentUniformImportTariffsEstimatedPercentageChangesinRegionalOutputandTrade 
Sector  IND PAK     XSA             XWA 
(a)IndustryOutput (In Millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tariff Rates 
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Table6.2:Experiment-2SouthAsianFreeTradeAgreement-SAFTA- EstimatedWelfare and Trade 
Effect 
Tariff Rates 
SAFTA=5% 
MFN=10% 
XWA=10% 
SAFTA=10 
The   trade  reform  scenario  (Experiment-2)  was  conducted  under  the  regional  trade 
liberalization policy option to examine the impact of South Asian Free Trade Agreement- 
SAFTA in different contexts from the perspective of Pakistan. As a member of the SAFTA, 
Pakistan.  committed to continue major trade liberalization measures, to establish and 
promote free trade arrangements  for  strengthening  inter-regional  economic  co-operation  
and  the  development  of national economies. In this experiment, it was assumed that 
Pakistan and each of the SAARC member  countries  in  the  model  (India  and  the  Rest  
of  South  Asia  comprising  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri lanka) remove 
their tariffs against each other, while maintaining heir  tariffs  against  the  rest  of  the  
South Asia.   
Table6.3:Experiment-2 
10PercentUniformImportTariffs 
EstimatedPercentageChangesinRegionalOutputandTrade 
 
Sector  IND PAK   XSA             XWA 
(a) IndustryOutput 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Tariff Rates 
   SAFTA=5% 
   MFN=10% 
   XWA=10% 
   SAFTA=10 
 
The   trade  reform  scenario  (Experiment-2)  was  conducted  under  the  regional  trade 
liberalization policy option to examine the impact of South Asian Free Trade Agreement- SAFTA in 
different contexts from the perspective of Pakistan. As a member of the SAFTA, Pakistan.  
Countries EV US$ 
 
% Of GDP TOT Vole-Export Volume-Import Export 
Price 
 
Import-
Price 
DTBAL 
US$ 
IND 5434.97 4.34 0.80 5.40 4.00 9.38 8.68 -
1100.9
0 m PAK 5643.63 6.35 0.99 7.11 7.77 5.97 7.44 -
786.77
m RAS -1592.56 -1.74 -0.57 -3.92 31.54 24.83 -2.12 -
1322.7
3m 
TEXT 0.03 0.60 0.01 0.11 
     
     
Exports     
TEXT -0.16 8.79 0.01 0.11 
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committed to continue major trade liberalization measures, to establish and promote free trad 
arrangements  for  strengthening  inter-regional  economic  co-operation  and  the  development  of 
national economies. In this experiment, it was assumed that Pakistan and each of the SAARC 
member  countries  in  the  model  (India  and  the  Rest  of  South  Asia  comprising  Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri lanka) remove their tariffs against each other, while maintaining heir  
tariffs  against  the  rest  of  the  South Asia.   According to results in SAFTA 5% tariff  the Pakistan 
industry output .079 compare to India -0.4 that Pakistan’s will benefit on SAFTA trade with India.  
Indian  industry out put show s that  in Auto, Textile India’s  position is better in compare with 
Pakistan.TheSecond experimentconsideredthat Pakistan’s 
reductionofimporttariffsto10percentundertheunilateraltradeliberalization.Theimpactofthisscenarioonre
gionalwelfareandtheresultingpercentagechanges insectorialoutputandtradearereportedinTable6.1, 
6.2.and6.3 respectively.Accordingly,ifPakistan 
reducesitsimporttariffsto10percentunilaterallyonaglobal 
basistomaintainauniformexternaltariffrate,Pakistan’sexperiences 
awelfaregainaroundUS$201million(1.53percentoftheGDP).Underthisscenario,Pakistan’s 
volumeofimportsrises 
by3.3percentwhileitsvolumeofexportsfallsslightlyby0.3percentreflectingthefactthatthe 
pressuretoincreaseimportsisstrongerthantheincreaseindemandforPakistan’s exportsbyunilateral 
liberalization.However,asaresultofthecompositeexportpriceincreaseby1.1 percent,Pakistan’s 
experiencesasmallimprovementintheterms-of-tradeof1.5percentandtherealGDP 
by0.8percent.Thewelfaregains orlossesforother regionsarequite 
variedunderthissimulation.However,theimpactofPakistan’s 
unilateralreductionofimporttariffsto10percentwillnotaffectotherregion’sealGDPorterms-of-
tradesignificantly 
Accordingly,theresultssuggestthatareductionofimporttariffsto10percentwillincreasePakistan’s 
welfareandterms-of-
tradeaswell.Althoughonemightexpectthatthereductionofimporttariffswouldincreasethedomesticoutputandtheref
oreincreaseexportsales,thispolicy reformwouldadverselyaffectPakistan’s 
domesticoutputinmostofthesectorsbecauseofforeign competition.Asimilar impactcanbeseeninexportsalestoo. 
Table6.4:SouthAsianFreeTradeAgreement-SAFTA(continued) 
EstimatedPercentageChangesinRegionalOutputandTrade 
AggregateExports 
   Sector              PAK             IND              XSA            XWA 
TEXT -0.078       -5.60 0.06 0.45 
 
Aggregate Imports 
 
TEXT -0.76       -5.60 0.03 0.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Experiments-Sensitivity of the Results 
As portrayed already, to measure the effect of Trade strategy changes on Pakistan's Trade with India, 
three extra investigations were attempted with an expanded versatility esteem for the import-import 
substitution parameter (Armington parameter)- ESUBM, to consider as Pakistan-India Trade 
connection. As needs be, under these three trials, to start with, the span of the ESUBM expanded by 
50 percent, and after that multiplied the worth (100 percent expansion) to decrease Pakistan's 
business sector power on the planet market. This would give a chance to look at the affectability or 
power of the model forecasts regarding the adjustment in the fundamental parameters.  
Table .6.3 introduces the consequences of these three investigations with the focal versatility esteem 
situations. In this manner, under the 15 percent uniform outer tax situation (E-4), in the event that we 
lessens Pakistan's business sector power by expanding the estimation of ESUBM by 50 percent (E-
4.1), it would build welfare pick up around US$201.84 million (0.60 percent of the GDP). Thus, 
multiplying the worth (100%) of ESUBM (E-4.2) would expand Pakistan's welfare by around 
US$237.60 million (or 2.41 percent of the GDP). In the previous case, the increment in welfare from 
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the focal worth is 0.44 percent, and in the last case, it is around 0.47 percent. In spite of the fact that 
these progressions are moderately little, it would recommend that even as a major nation would be in a 
position to pick up from the one-sided Trade liberalization. The welfare increments for the nation as the 
flexibilities increment. On the other hand, under these two situations, we little increment as far as Trade 
as flexibilities increments. Besides, under these situations, the effect on terms-of-Trade is very little 
unique in relation to the focal situation case  
Essentially, test 2 (E-2) manages the SAFTA situation. As appeared in Table17, with the esteem's 
increment of ESUBM, both the welfare and the terms-of-Trade will increment straightly from the focal 
situation case. Subsequently, the welfare pick up for Pakistan's under the 50 percent expansion in 
ESUBM (E-5.1) is roughly US$33.38 million (2.58 percent of the GDP), though under the 100 percent 
expansion situation (E-5.2), it is around US$422 million (2.33 percent of the GDP). Along these lines 
the welfare will increment by 4.2 percent from its focal quality situation, and in the last case it will 
increment by 5.2 percent. Along these lines, welfare increments as versatilities increment. Along these 
lines, the additions are fairly direct with both the cases mirroring the model's power results.  
Test 3 (E-3) considered the consolidated arrangement of SAFTA cum 15% uniform import levies 
situation Thus, half increment of the estimation of ESUBM (E-6.1), would expand welfare pick up 
around US$311million (from US$221 million at the focal situation) or 5.11percent of the GDP. Here, the 
increment in welfare from the focal worth is 31 percent. Essentially, multiplying the estimation of 
ESUBM (E-6.2) would expand Pakistan's welfare by around US$720 million or 7.22 percent of the 
GDP. For this situation, the increment in welfare from the focal quality is 61 percent. Additionally, under 
these two situations, the increment as far as Trade is 8.0 and 8.8 individually. Accordingly the changes 
in the terms of Trade from the focal worth are 1.7 and 3.6 percent separately. In spite of the fact that 
these welfare and terms-of-Trade increases are not directly identified with the adjustments in the 
Armington versatility ESUBM, the outcome would propose that one-sided Trade liberalization in blend 
with territorial Trade liberalization licenses Pakistan to grow its fare segments while all segments 
contend all the more nearly with a bigger number of contending mixed bags from abroad.  
Table 6.3. Highlights Pakistan's sectorial yield, fares and imports under the affectability examination 
situations. Appropriately, Pakistan's industry yield falls altogether in all most every one of the divisions 
aside from critical increments in Agriculture and Textile wearing attire. Pakistan's fare additionally 
diminish extensively under every one of the examinations as appeared in of Table 6.4, aside from 
Textile and farming under E-2, and E-3 Auto Parts, under E-6 Parma, and Financial Services and 
Insurance and Transport and Logistics. India's position in E-2 and E-3 vastly improved contrast with 
Pakistan.  
Non-Economic Benefits  
Other than the welfare and terms of Trade additions recommended by the reenactments, provincial 
Trade liberalization under SAFTA may have some non-financial advantages to Pakistan especially 
social and political advantages; those are hard to represent quantity. For instance, SAFTA can help its 
individuals to talk with one voice in worldwide arrangements and build up a typical comprehension on a 
few worldwide Trade related issues. It could likewise decrease the political question among individuals 
and make the locale a more appealing area for outside direct ventures. Pakistan is essential for getting 
noteworthy advantages from FDI, liberalization of Trade and FDI approaches should be supplemented 
by fitting  arrangement measures regarding training, R&D, and human capital aggregation if Trade 
transaction with India will restore. 
6.5.ISSUES ON SAFTA OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY OF PAKISTAN 
The Cronbach alpha test was applied for reliability and internal consistency of the multi-
itembarrierscaleonallbarriers.Theinternalconsistencyofthequestionnairewas checked by this test. 
Table6.5.ReliabilityStatistics 
Cronbach’salpha Cronbach’salphabasedonstandardizedite
ms 
Nofitems 
.987 .988 25 
 
FromTable6.5 one can see that the Cronbachalpha value is 0.98 which is considered to have a very high 
internal consistency and reliability. So,it was concluded that the scales for the multi- item barrier questions 
were very reliable and had an internal consistency
I S S N  2 2 7 8 - 5 6 1 2  
V o l u m e  1 1  N u m b e r  4  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  J o u r n a l  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  I n f o r m a t i o n  T e c h n o l o g y  
2923 | P a g e                                   c o u n c i l  f o r  I n n o v a t i v e  R e s e a r c h  
A u g u s t  2 0 1 6                                               w w w . c i r w o r l d . c o m  
 
6.5.Exporters’perceptionofbarriersduringexport/Natureofproblemfaced 
byPakistaniexportersduringexporttotheINDIA 
One-samplet-test 
Barrier N Mean Std. 
deviatio
n 
t-value Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Sig.at 
.05 
Tariff barrier 50 3.0667 1.19131 7.196 .000 YeS 
governmentalregulations 50 3.4667 1.25505 9.299 .000 YeS 
Priceofthecommodity 50 2.5833 1.12433 4.294 .000 YeS 
Marketaccessproblem 50 3.5000 1.44386 8.262 .000 YeS 
informationalbarrier 50 3.0667 1.26044 6.801 .000 YeS 
legalandPoliticalbarriers 50 2.4000 1.06086 3.213 .002 YeS 
Customprocedureandlicensing. 50 3.5000 1.30838 9.117 .000 YeS 
Technicalstandards 
andhealthregulations 
50 4.1000 1.18893 13.942 .000 YeS 
nti-dumping 50 3.1000 1.50367 5.873 .000 YeS 
languagesandcustoms 50 3.0167 .96536 8.479 .000 YeS 
Culture 50 2.8500 1.32544 5.201 .000 YeS 
labelingandpackagingrequirement 50 4.0333 1.05713 15.192 .000 YeS 
Sanitaryandphytosanitary(SPS)mea
sures 
50 3.9500 1.06445 14.481 .000 YeS 
importquotasofdestinationcountry 50 2.4333 1.14042 3.215 .002 YeS 
Demandoftheproduct 50 2.7000 1.19745 4.787 .000 YeS 
Competitionfromfirmsinforeignmark
ets 
50 2.5833 1.23908 3.897 .000 YeS 
lackofcapitaltofinanceexpansi
oninto foreignmarkets 
50 2.9667 1.22082 6.387 .000 YeS 
businessenvironment 
ofthetargetingcountry 
50 2.6000 1.06086 4.673 .000 YeS 
industrialpropertyrightsandcopyright
s 
50 2.7333 1.27381 4.703 .000 YeS 
Corruption 50 2.6167 1.27680 3.984 .000 YeS 
Currency Traderate 50 3.2667 1.19131 8.496 .000 YeS 
Climaticconditionsofdestinationcou
ntry 
50 2.0500 1.01556 .686 .495 No 
Transportationcostandduration 50 2.7833 1.23634 5.158 .000 YeS 
Certification 50 3.3167 1.26881 8.282 .000 YeS 
Workingstructure/scheduleofthetar
geting country 
50 1.6667 .83700 -2.715 .009 YeS 
 
Table-6.5 shows that Pakistani exporters have significant feelings for all the barriers except the climatic 
conditions of the destination country ,which are regarded by the mas a Internal factor. 
6.7Percentage analysis 
Percentageanalysishasbeendonetocheckthestrengthofeachsignificantbarrier.These barriers are divided into 
two parts – common barriers to export and hidden barriers. 
Commonbarriersarethosethatexistduetogovernmentalregulationsandpoliciesand 
whichglobalorganizationssuchasWTOfindasolution,andtheycansolvethroughthe 
agreements.Hiddenbarriersarethosethatexistnaturally,andgovernmentbodiescannot really make solutions on 
them, but these hidden barriers can affect export negatively. 
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6.6 CommonBarriers 
Table6.6..Percentageanalysisof Pakistani exporters’perceptionofcommonbarriers 
No. Commonbarriers Notandissu
e atall(1) 
Nobarrier 
(2) 
Notseenas 
barrier(3) 
barrier(4) Veryserious 
barrier(5) 
1. Tariff 5% 37% 20% 23% 15% 
2. Governmentalregulatio
ns 
10% 15% 13% 42% 20% 
 
 
 
 
      
3. Customsprocedurean
d  
 
licensing 
7% 22% 17% 25% 30% 
4. Anti-dumping 17% 25% 12% 20% 27% 
5. Technicalstandards 
andhealthregulations 
5% 10% 8% 30% 47% 
6. Sanitaryandphytosanita
ry measures 
2% 13% 8% 42% 35% 
7. importquotaof 
destinationcountr
y 
23% 33% 25% 13% 5% 
8. industrialpropertyrights 
andcopyrights 
20% 27% 23% 20% 10% 
9. Certification 10% 20% 17% 35% 18% 
10. Priceofthecommodity 20% 27% 33% 15% 5% 
 
Porters’perceptionofcommonbarrier. Table 3 and Fig. 2 show that respondents regard governmental 
regulations, customs procedure and licensing, technical standards and health regulations, sanitary and 
phytosanitarymeasuresandcertificationasthemajorbarrierstoexport.Theanti-dumping 
andtariffbarrierarenotthemajorbarriersbuttendstobethemajorones.Thetariffbarrier 
maybelowduetoseveralroundsofGATTandWTo.Theimportquotaofthedestination 
countryandthePriceofthecommodityarenotregardedasbarriers,either. 
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6.7.Hiddenbarriers 
6.7 
Table6.7.PercentageanalysisofPakistaniexporters’perceptionofhiddenbarriers 
No Hiddenbarriers Notanissue 
atall(1) 
Nobarrier 
(2) 
Notseenas 
a barrier(3) 
barrier 
(4) 
Veryserious 
barrier(5) 
1. Marketaccessproblem 13% 17% 10% 27% 28% 
2. informationalbarrier 13% 23% 18% 33% 17% 
3. legalandpolitical barriers 25% 27% 33% 13% 2% 
4. languagesandcustoms 5% 23% 43% 22% 7% 
5. Culture 17% 32% 15% 23% 13% 
6. Demandoftheproduct 20% 22% 35% 15% 8% 
7. Competitionfromthefirmsinth
e foreignmarket 
25% 23% 27% 18% 7% 
8. lackofcapitaltofinance 
expansionintoforeignmark
et 
15% 18% 33% 22% 12% 
9. businessenvironment 
ofthe targetingcountry 
18% 25% 38% 15% 3% 
10. Corruption 23% 30% 15% 25% 7% 
11. Currency Traderate 8% 20% 23% 33% 15% 
13. Transportationcostanddurati
on 
17% 30% 20% 25% 8% 
14. Workingstructure/schedule
of thetargetingcountry 
55% 25% 18% 2% 0% 
15. labelingandpackagi
ng regulations 
3% 7% 13% 37% 40% 
 
Table6.7. and Fig. 3 show that the respondents regard the market access problems and 
labelingandpackagingasthemajorbarrierstoexport.Althoughnotthemajorbarriers 
butculturalone,thecurrencyTraderateandinformationalbarriertendtobethemajor 
barrierstoexport.TheLegalandPoliticalbarriers,LanguagesandCustoms,demandof 
theproduct,workingstructure/scheduleofthetargetingcountry,businessenvironment are not regarded 
as barriers to export. 
When exporters were asked about the other barriers they face than the above- mentioned common 
and hidden barriers, most of the respondents said that coordination is another barrier they face 
mostly during export.
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Fig3.PercentageanalysisofPakistaniexporters’perceptionofhiddenbarrier 
6.4.Exporters’attitudeafterdecreasingthestrengthofbarriers 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.4.Exporters’opiniononexportafterdecreasingthestrengthofbarriersExporters have been askedif they 
are ready toexport moretothe INDIAafter these barrierswillbeless,and70% of theexporterssaidyes, 22% 
saidmaybe, and8% said no.Thus,exportersarepositiveregardingexporttotheINDIA.India’sexporttotheINDIAcan 
be increased if these barriers get less or are removed.   
Conclusions 
This research focused on the Barrier of Pak-India trade relation on SAFTA by using Model Pakistan’s 
volume of imports rises by 1.23 percent while its volume of exports falls slightly by 0.4 percent 
reflecting the fact that the pressure to increase imports is stronger than the increase in demand for 
Pakistan’s exports by unilateral liberalization. However, as a result of the composite export price 
increase by 2.1 percent, Pakistan’s experiences a small improvement in the terms-of-trade of 1.5 
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percent and the real GDP by 0.9 percent. The welfare gains or losses for other regions are quite 
varied under this simulation. However, since Pakistanis impact on unilateral reduction of import 
tariffs to 15 percent will not affect other region’s real GDP or terms-of-trade significantly. 
Althoughnotthemajorbarriers 
butculturalone,thecurrencyTraderateandinformationalbarriertendtobethemajor 
barrierstoexport.TheLegalandPoliticalbarriers,LanguagesandCustoms,demandof 
theproduct,workingstructure/scheduleofthetargetingcountry,businessenvironment are not regarded 
as barriers to export. 
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